Several of the posters on the Facebook page about 'A Prophet Without Honor' discuss Neville Chamberlain, and various revisionist historians who attempt to rehabilitate his conduct at Munich. I'm a novelist, not a historian, but I did do my research on the book, and I thought I'd weigh in. In my opinion, Chamberlain's craven, utterly unworthy behavior at Munich did more than anything else except the personality of Hitler himself, to bring about the calamity of World War II. More opinionated text follows.
Chamberlain's apologists attempt to justify his conduct at Munich by pointing to the relative unpreparedness of Great Britain for war at that time, and the measures the British took between Munich and September, 1939. What this argument overlooks is that the catastrophe at Munich was primarily political. What Chamberlain's capitulation to what were obviously excessive demands of Hitler, as well as the hysterical relief with which he announced the temporary peace, demonstrated to the European community, was that Great Britain was no longer a reliable ally against German aggression. The message was heard loud and clear throughout Europe, not only by Hitler himself, but - of greater import - by another odious sociopath residing further East. Stalin drew his own conclusions, and the result was the infamous Soviet-Nazi Pact on August 23, 1939, without which World War II would not have commenced.
Which is the point. Had Chamberlain stood firm in 1938, any war that began would likely have been a two front war, which means no war would have begun. In any case, German war planners would have had to deal with that contingency. Worse. At that time, there was in the Wehrmacht the most serious anti-Hitler cabal that existed before the plot of July 22, 1944. It fully expected Chamberlain to remain firm, Hitler to press for war, and to seize power thereupon. But it didn't happen, thanks to Chamberlain, and Hitler consolidated his hold on the German public.
It was actually the succession of bloodless triumphs in the late 30's that gave the public confidence in Hitler, the operative word being 'bloodless'. 'A Prophet Without Honor' ends in 1936, with the reoccupation of the Rhineland. At that point in time, the German public was actually somewhat impatient with Hitler, because of the deprivations in standard of living that the rapid remilitarization had caused, and not indifferent to the barbarities of Naziism. Further, even though Hitler himself was a warmonger, the German public remembered all too well the horrors of the Great War. The fact that Hitler achieved his triumphs without war was central to its rising faith in him. In that respect, Chamberlain and the other compromising statesmen of the time granted Hitler his cachet.
Worst of all, Chamberlain and the accommodating wing of the Conservative Party learned nothing. As the current film 'Darkest Hour' colorfully recounts, after the disasters on the Continent in the spring of 1940, Chamberlain advocated appeasing Hitler again, granting Germany full sway on the continent if the British Empire were left intact, i.e., Hitler would be allowed to oppress the peoples of Europe if Great Britain remained free to oppress the peoples of India and Africa. Winston Churchill had a career that in all must every other respect was a disaster. But there is no question that is availability to the British in 1940 was providential.
It is my own cynical belief that revisionist views of Chamberlain owe more to recent politics than any genuine belief in a revisionist viewpoint. For those opposing Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Chamberlain's example has always been a bone in the throat. I don't want to get into those thorny areas. But whatever you think, that was then, this is now - the case for or against George W. Bush isn't going to be changed by anything regarding Neville Chamberlain.
Just my two cents - I'm a novelist, not a historian. The take away I hope readers glean from this is that critiques of Chamberlain based on the state of military readiness of Great Britain miss the point entirely. There would never have been a war, because it would have been a two front war. That the eventual conflict was a one-front war is owing largely if not entirely on the effect of Munich on Stalin's evaluation of British resolve. That to me is the bottom line on Neville Chamberlain.
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